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Traditionally, journalism has long been regarded as a „fourth estate‟: a central component of 
democracy, and, in particular, as a means whereby the power of the state can be monitored and, if 
necessary, limited. According to classic liberal theory, as expounded most famously by Fred 
Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm in Four Theories of the Press: „the underlying 
purpose of the media was to help discover truth, to assist in the process of solving political and 
social problems by presenting all manner of evidence and opinion as the basis for decisions‟. In 
order properly to fulfil this purpose, the media needed to be free from government controls or 
domination, since its prime duty was „to keep officers of the state from abusing or exceeding their 
authority. It was to be the watchdog over the workings of democracy, ever vigilant to spot and 
expose any arbitrary or authoritarian practice‟. 
 
In this familiar vision of things, the journalist is a crusader after truth, championing free expression 
and exposing corruption, oppression, and abuses of official authority. Expressions of this view are 
legion. For example, in 1821 James Mill called the freedom of the press „an indispensable security, 
and the greatest safeguard of the interests of mankind‟, and the great C.P. Scott argued that 
journalism „implies honesty, cleanness, courage, fairness and a sense of duty to the reader and the 
community … Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the mode of 
presentation, must the unclouded face of truth suffer wrong‟. Meanwhile, in his classic study of 
newspapers, Dangerous Estate, Francis Williams called the press „a minefield through which 
authority, great and small and at every level of policy and administration, must step warily, 
conscious always that a false step may blow it up‟. Most recently this view has found powerful 
expression in David Randall‟s The Universal Journalist, in which he argues that the job of the 
journalist is, above all, to question, and then to: 
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 Discover and publish information that replaces rumour and speculation. 
 Resist or evade government controls. 
 Inform, and so empower, voters. 
 Subvert those whose authority relies on a lack of public information. 
 Scrutinise the action and inaction of governments, elected representatives and public 
services. 
 Scrutinise businesses, their treatment of workers and customers, and the quality of their 
products. 
 Comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable, providing a voice for those who cannot 
normally be heard in public. 
 Hold up a mirror to society, reflecting its virtues and vices and also debunking its cherished 
myths 
 Ensure that justice is done, is seen to be done and investigations carried out where this is 
not so. 
 Promote the free exchange of ideas, especially by providing a platform for those with 
philosophies alternative to the prevailing ones. 
 
Now, however admirable these sentiments may be, and however strongly they accord with the way 
in which many individual journalists do indeed see their role, they are surely quite extraordinarily 
hard to square with the daily reality of most of the British press. Consider, for example, the 
majority of papers‟ attitudes to refugees and asylum seekers, their collusion in the clipping of the 
coinage of civil liberties post 9/11, their support for a legally dubious invasion of Iraq, their 
outright dismissal of Clare Short‟s revelation of the illegal bugging of the U.N. by the secret 
services, their aggressive stance towards the BBC in its struggles with the government in the 
Gilligan/Kelly affair, and their hostility towards whistle-blowers such as Catherine Gunn and David 
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Shayler.  All of these, and many more, suggest that we seriously need to reconsider the extent to 
which the British press is, and, indeed, ever has been, a „fourth estate‟.  
 
For a start, it would be quite mistaken to assume that all newspapers are, or ever have been, driven 
by anything remotely resembling liberal, let alone progressive, values. As James Curran has clearly 
shown in Power Without Responsibility, the repeal of the stamp duty and of other „taxes on 
knowledge‟ in the nineteenth century was motivated not by governmental conversion to the cause 
of press freedom; instead, it stemmed from the growing realisation amongst politicians and other 
members of the establishment that if  entrepreneurs and industrialists could be tempted to enter the 
newspaper market then this could kill off the hated radical press far more effectively than taxes had 
ever done – by tempting away its readers, by raising the cost of newspaper production (which mass 
market papers could offset via advertising revenues), or by a combination of the two. That the 
powers-that-be intended the press to be used as an agent of social control and regulation rather than 
as a means of popular enlightenment and empowerment is clearly evident from the historical 
record. Thus, for example, in 1832 we find Bulwer Lytton arguing that: „we have made a long and 
fruitless experiment of the gibbet and the hulks. Is it not time to consider whether the printer and 
his types may not provide better for the peace and honour of a free state, than the gaoler and the 
hangman. Whether, in one word, cheap knowledge may not be a better political agent than costly 
punishment‟.  Later, Gladstone was to declare that: „the freedom of the press was not merely to be 
permitted and tolerated, but to be highly prized, for it tended to bring closer together all the national 
interests and preserve the institutions of the country‟, but perhaps the clearest indication of the 
motives of the reformers is provided Milner-Gibson, the president of the Association for the Repeal 
of the Taxes on Knowledge, who argued in 1850 that repeal would create „a  cheap press in the 
hands of men of good moral character, of respectability, and of capital‟ which would give them „the 
power of gaining access by newspapers, by faithful record of the facts, to the minds of the working 
classes‟. It is thus hardly surprising that the modern British press, unlike that of many western 
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democracies, should have always been so overwhelmingly conservative, not to say reactionary, in 
character.  
 
Furthermore, it would be equally mistaken to regard the media as a whole, and the press in 
particular, as the detached observers of the political process which liberal theory and professional 
journalistic ideology suggest. The spheres of journalism and government have never been 
hermetically sealed off one from another, and indeed have increasingly overlapped as journalists 
and politicians have grown ever more mutually reliant. Newspapers, in particular,  have very 
definite political and economic agendas and are thus keen to involve themselves actively on the 
political scene. This, however, is almost never acknowledged by journalists themselves, with the 
exception of the Guardian’s press correspondent Roy Greenslade (author of the excellent Press 
Gang: How Newspapers Make Profit from Propaganda) and the same paper‟s  David Walker, who 
noted in a recent issue of Journalism that: „the power held by journalists and the media 
organisations for which they work is unperceived or assumed away. The occupational myth of the 
English political specialist is the dented sword of truth in a Manichean world where a lonely battle 
is fought for honesty‟, and pointed out in his contribution to Media Power, Professionals and 
Policies that: „the exercise of “investigative journalism” rarely extends to the relationship of 
journalists with each other, with politicians or proprietors‟.  
 
The relationship between journalists and politicians is, in fact, much more collusive than either side 
would like to admit, and has become even more so with the growth of the media into ever more 
vast corporate entities. The old-fashioned press barons such as Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
certainly used their papers to pursue specifically political objectives such as Empire free trade, but 
an owner today is far more likely to be a corporation than a single proprietor and their activities 
tend to consist in using their media to fawn on politicians who favour them, attack those who don‟t, 
and publish stories that further their business interests. As Steven Barnett and Ivor Gaber point out 
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in Westminster Tales, modern media barons like Rupert Murdoch „take a more instrumental view 
based on their analysis of which party will best serve corporate interests and commercial 
ambitions‟. From this there follows „a growing interdependence of media entrepreneurs and 
political parties for their own respective self-advancements. Senior politicians have become more 
and more convinced (whether rightly or not) of the power of the media and have therefore sought to 
create harmonious relationships with a few elite owners. Simultaneously, electronic and market 
developments in the media have raised important legislative issues (for example, on cross-
ownership and pay-TV access) which have made it more imperative for owners seeking 
government favours to ensure productive relationships with ruling parties‟. 
    
The classic liberal argument, as we have seen, tends to assume that it is governments which should 
be the sole object of press vigilance, since, in its view, they are the main seat of power in society. 
But, in the world in which we now live,  corporations and other vast private interests have taken 
over many of the functions previously performed by the state. And amongst these private interests, 
media corporations loom ever larger and more powerful. As James Curran has put it: „the issue is 
no longer simply that the media are compromised by their links to big business: the media are big 
business‟. This means that those concerned today with questions of press freedom need to concern 
themselves not only with state-originated forms of censorship such as the Official Secrets Act and 
the current barrage of anti-terrorism measures but also market-generated forms of censorship such 
as overweening proprietor power, cross-media concentration, the commodification of information, 
the privileging of media investors over media audiences, the growth of corporate values at the 
expense of  public service ones, the interdependence of governments and media owners, and so on. 
As John Keane points out in The Media and Democracy: „market competition produces market 
censorship. Private ownership of the media produces private caprice. Those who control the market 
sphere of producing and distributing information determine, prior to publication, what products 
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(such as books, magazines, newspapers, television programmes, computer software) will be mass 
produced and, thus, which opinions officially gain entry into the “marketplace of opinions”‟. 
 
Doubts about the British press as a fourth estate are given considerable impetus by Bruce Page‟s 
recent book The Murdoch Archipelago. We are not exactly short of critical studies of Murdoch's 
empire, but what distinguishes Page's book, and makes it especially relevant to the present context, 
is its intensely detailed focus on Murdoch‟s relationship with political authority - in Australia, 
Britain, America and China - and on its consequences for journalistic standards in his media. Page's 
thesis is that Murdoch's activities need to be understood in terms of a politico-business model, and 
that Newscorp's core competence is 'swapping approval with the controllers of the state'.  In this 
vision of things, the function of political journalism is not to act as a watchdog but, on the contrary, 
consists of maintaining sympathetic relations with authority. The result is the publication of  what 
he calls pseudo-newspapers, and, at worst, as when the Murdoch press helped Thatcher to cover-up 
the Westland affair or amplified her government's attack on the Thames TV documentary Death on 
the Rock, a pernicious form of  anti-journalism and privatised government propaganda in which, as 
Page puts it, 'official lies simply flow in, to be parroted out'.  Indeed, Page‟s detailed accounts of 
the intimate workings of the Thatcher/Murdoch axis (which make excellent use of the journals of 
Woodrow Wyatt, who acted as courtier to both parties) recalls former Times editor Charles 
Douglas-Home‟s remarkably candid remark (quoted in Press Gang)  that: „Rupert and Mrs 
Thatcher consult regularly on every important matter of policy, especially as they relate to his 
economic and political interests. Around here, he‟s jokingly referred to as “Mr Prime Minister”, 
except that it‟s no longer much of a joke. In many respects he is the phantom prime minister of the 
country‟.     
 
The reason for such comprehensive abandonment of the ideals of the Fourth Estate can be summed 
up in one word: self-interest. Thus Murdoch routinely uses his media to support governments 
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which support his business interests. So, for example, in the mid 1990s the Labour Party in the UK 
let it be known that it would drop its traditional hostility to Murdoch's expansionism, and thus, in 
the 1997 and 2001 General Elections, the Sun supported Labour. Murdoch is then handsomely 
repaid in the 2004 Communications Act, which enables him finally to make significant inroads into 
British terrestrial television, with the consequence that, during and after the invasion of Iraq the 
Murdoch press not only acts as a cheerleader for Blair but savagely attacks as 'disloyal' any media 
outlet daring to voice criticism of the war. The corollary of this kind of mutual back-scratching is, 
of course, a ferocious hostility to governments and political parties which Murdoch deems inimical 
to his business interests - witness his Australian papers' pivotal role in the destabilisation of the 
Gough Whitlam government in 1974-5, and, in Britain, the remorseless hostility of his papers 
towards the European Union and pre-Blair Labour. 
 
One of the most striking aspects of Murdoch's relationships with political parties is their bare-faced 
promiscuity - he may be a neo-liberal ideologue who believes passionately in the virtues of the 
market, but Page's detailed recounting of his global wheeling and dealing convincingly 
demonstrates that, when calculating which parties his media will support, their ideological 
complexion counts for nothing compared with whether or not their media policies are Murdoch-
friendly. Particularly significant, in this respect, are Murdoch's dealings with the Chinese. As 
Andrew Neil argues in Full Disclosure, these „required a wrenching U-turn in attitudes towards 
China since the mid-eighties‟ and amply demonstrate how „he will always moderate his political 
fundamentalism if it suits his business strategy‟.         
 
In 1993 Murdoch, eager to colonise the potentially vast Chinese television market, took a 
controlling stake in Satellite Television Asia Region (Star TV), and, within months, was playing 
the familiar role of the Great Liberator, arguing that: 'Advances in the technology of 
communications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes ... Satellite 
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broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to by pass 
state-controlled television channels'. So much for the rhetoric. In reality, however, Murdoch has 
done everything possible, including indulging in the most craven forms of self-censorship, to 
ingratiate himself with China's communist leaders. Thus after acquiring Star he immediately threw 
off BBC World, as its coverage of the Tiananmen  protests had annoyed them. Similarly, The 
Times' Jonathan Mirsky quit when the paper refused repeatedly to run articles in which he revealed 
that dissidence in China was widespread, and when Murdoch discovered that his company Harper 
Collins was intending to publish a book (East and West) by former Hong Kong Governor Chris 
Patten which was critical of the Chinese gerontocracy, he insisted that the contract was terminated. 
As he put it: 'Let someone else annoy them'. He also invested $5.4 million into the People's Daily, 
and Harper Collins published the English translation of Deng Rong's hagiography of her father 
Deng Xiaoping. As Jamie Davis, head of Star TV in China was quoted as saying in the Financial 
Times, 9 January 2003: 'everything in China is about relationships and about mutual benefit. I think 
Rupert Murdoch has a very good relationship with the Chinese government ... and we work hard at 
it'. And in March 2001, James Murdoch, who was then running Newscorp's Asian operations, told a 
Los Angeles business conference that negative media portrayals of the Chinese regime were 
'destabilising forces' and 'very, very dangerous for the Chinese government'. However, as Page 
argues: 'a good thing about Murdoch's Chinese activities is that no democratic politician who 
agrees to examine them can entertain honest doubt about the character of the operation' . 
 
Page concludes that: „dictatorship and state monopoly do not repel him, provided Newscorp can cut 
a deal with the system. Outfits like the BBC, however, under any political or economic system, are 
competitors which it is important to undermine‟. Thus Murdoch is much less exercised by real 
totalitarians than by those he calls 'liberal totalitarians'. These turn out to be anybody who stands in 
the way of his amassing ever more media power: the Australian Broadcasting Commission, the 
Independent Television Commission, the BBC, the Office of Fair Trading, the Federal 
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Communications Commission, and so on; in other words all those responsible for structures 
devised by democratic states in order limit abuses of media power. 
 
The paradox is, however, as Page all too clearly demonstrates, that Murdoch has repeatedly run 
rings round the 'liberal totalitarians', acquiring The Times and Sunday Times in spite of regulations 
aimed at limiting the concentration of the UK press; establishing Sky in Luxembourg, outside the 
jurisdiction of British regulators, even though it was aimed at British audiences; taking over British 
Satellite Broadcasting to form BSkyB, thus establishing a monopoly satellite broadcasting system 
in complete contravention of rules which, if the political will to enforce them had existed, could 
have prevented this from happening; changing his nationality from Australian to American in order 
to buy Fox, thus thumbing his nose at the rules which prevent non-Americans from buying 
American media companies; relentlessly lobbying British politicians and civil servants to ensure 
that BSkyB is effectively immunised from any obligation to carry a majority of EU-produced 
programmes under the Television Sans Frontieres directive; and effectively bribing the present 
Labour government to formulate, and then to force through in the face of considerable cross-party 
opposition, a Communications Bill expressly designed to further his own interests. As Murdoch's 
political relationships across the world have all too clearly demonstrated, in Page‟s view: 'market 
dominion in modern states is unsustainable without political protection or collaboration'. So much 
for the 'free' market, then. And some 'totalitarians' these all-too-liberal liberals turned out to be! 
 
Page concludes that the positioning of Murdoch's papers is motivated above all by corporate tactics, 
and that this leaves an indelible stain on their journalism, one which clearly marks it out as quite 
different from the kinds of journalism to be found elsewhere: 'the politically neutral BBC, the 
liberal Guardian, the illiberal Daily Mail and the conservative Wall Street Journal all resemble 
each other more than any of them resemble Newscorp media output. All, in utterly dissimilar ways, 
have worked within the constitution of the state to consolidate their independence from it. 
 10 
Newscorp is about eroding the boundaries between the state power and media operations‟. Of 
course, politicians are equally culpable for having allowed, and indeed, in some cases, encouraged, 
the development of this situation, but as Page points out, as often as not, they are moved by fear as 
much as by admiration. Nonetheless, whatever their motives, they now, Page argues, find 
themselves revolving with Murdoch's media in what he calls  „a dance of folly which has at least 
the potential to be a dance of death for democracy'. Were this entirely cynical, self-interested, 
instrumental view of journalism to spread to the press as a whole, the idea of the press as a fourth 
estate (never, as we have seen, an entirely convincing one in the first place as far as the British 
press is concerned) would need to be put to sleep once and for all. 
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